The Power of Transport Diplomacy: How Iran Is Strengthening Its Influence in Central Asia

In recent years, Iran has noticeably stepped up its transport diplomacy efforts with regards to its Central Asian neighbors. This momentum stems from both sides' shared interest in bolstering their competitive positions in transit trade, as overland corridors running East-West and North-South continue to gain strategic importance.


Tehran sees cooperation with Central Asian countries as a gateway for trade, economic growth, and infrastructure development—key components of its broader "Look to the East" strategy to counteract international sanctions. The region's transit potential is particularly compelling for Iran, providing crucial access to major economic players such as China and Russia.
On the other hand, Central Asia has become pivotal in reshaping Eurasian transport infrastructure in recent years, creating a new impetus for developing trans-Iranian corridors linking Western Asia, Southern Asia, and Europe.

Economic sanctions have certainly constrained Iran's ability to invest in upgrading its logistics infrastructure and transportation networks spread across the country. However, rising geopolitical tensions worldwide—which impact on maritime trade stability—have created an opportunity for Iran to cement its position as a key regional transit hub. To achieve this, Iran is building strategic partnerships with neighboring countries, prioritizing mutual benefit. This has become a top-tier strategic objective backed by concrete action, most visibly through the rapid expansion of the Southern Corridor to Europe, with active involvement from almost all Central Asian nations and China.
Building resilient logistics networks across Iran on the East-West corridor aligns with China's New Silk Road initiative ("Belt and Road Initiative"), which Tehran formally joined in 2021 following a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Beijing.
A year ago, Iran's Ministry of Transport and Urban Development rolled out an ambitious plan to establish nine transit railway corridors stretching across 17,000 kilometers with an investment of over $10 billion. Once completed, the initiative will enable Iran's railways to handle approximately 60 million tons of cargo annually.
Several government initiatives are designed to enhance the Southern Railway Corridor and establish it as the shortest direct trade route between East and West. Significantly, in December 2025, Ankara and Tehran agreed to build a nearly 200-kilometer railway connecting Marand to Cheshmeh Soraya, extending to the Turkish border town of Aralyk. Opening this transport link will eliminate the current bottleneck of ferrying cargo across Lake Van in Turkish territory, which has been a major obstacle to seamless freight movement along the Southern Corridor.
China stands as one of the principal stakeholders in the functioning of the southern branch of the New Silk Road. Given the heightened tensions in oceanic waters and the protracted war in Ukraine—which has rendered the Northern corridor through Russia and Belarus impracticable—China is diverting part of its cargo flows destined for Europe toward continental routes. Central Asian and South Caucasian countries are positioning themselves as alternatives, offering multimodal transport solutions across the Caspian and Black Seas.
China is already deeply engaged in trans-Caspian logistics. In 2024, Chinese cargo transported via the Middle Corridor exceeded 27,000 containers—a staggering 25-fold increase from 2023. Simultaneously, Beijing is aggressively pursuing development of the southern transit route, motivated by a combination of economic gains and geopolitical strategy.
The European Union is China's second-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade totaling $762 billion in 2024 and exceeding $750 billion in the first 11 months of 2025.
Given that Chinese exports to the EU are predominantly high-tech products, Beijing understandably favors containerized rail transport for overland logistics operations.
Technically speaking, the Iran-based transit corridor offers the optimal solution for this objective and is destined to become fully rail-dependent. China is therefore actively investing in its realization. Notably, construction is advancing on the Sarakhs railway terminal at the Turkmen-Iranian border, designed to accelerate container movements along the "China-Central Asia-Iran-Turkey-EU/Gulf markets" sea corridor. By August 2025, Iran reported that more than half of the construction work had been completed.
Washington's acquisition of exclusive development rights over the Zangezur Corridor, rebranded as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), is intensifying Beijing's commitment to advancing the Southern Corridor via Iran.
A joint venture, "TRIPP Development Company," has been established with the United States holding a controlling 74 percent stake.
Beijing may well perceive the TRIPP initiative as a potential U.S. maneuver to gain control over Middle Corridor logistics. To reduce this exposure, China requires independent transport routes that bypass the Caspian Sea entirely.
China is substantially investing in modernizing Iran's railway network. An agreement has been secured to electrify a 1,000-kilometer railway line from Sarakhs to Razi on Turkey's border. The project entails constructing parallel tracks along sections of the line, enabling freight capacity to triple to 15 million tons annually.
Meanwhile Iran and Turkmenistan are constructing dual-gauge railway lines (1,435 mm and 1,520 mm) between the Sarakhs stations to accelerate freight flows and boost throughput at the border checkpoint.
The nations have set a target to triple cross-border cargo shipments to 20 million tons per year, with 6 million tons moving via railway connections.
The parties are strongly committed to revitalizing the Southern Railway Corridor toward Western markets, as well as the multimodal "Central Asia-Persian Gulf" transport corridor, established in 2016 by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Oman through the Ashgabat Agreement.
It is important to note that Uzbekistan's strategic initiative to diversify trade flows and develop efficient transport logistics with global markets has been instrumental in establishing the southern branch of the "East-West" transit corridor. In 2022, Tashkent and Ankara jointly inaugurated freight services along the "Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey" route. The corridor, positioned for potential expansion into the EU, was promoted as the fastest and most reliable option for bilateral export-import operations.
Uzbekistan is positioning the Southern Corridor—currently capped at 10 million tons annually due to technical and political constraints—as a primary vehicle for economic growth, leveraging significantly increased transit service revenues.
This outlook hinges on the completion of the "China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan" railway line, scheduled for 2030. Once integrated with Iran's railway infrastructure within the SCO's unified transport framework, the corridor will shorten the East Asia-Europe trade route by 900 kilometers and reduce shipping times by 7-8 days.
Ultimately, the Southern Railway Corridor will emerge as the shortest single-mode transport link between two major economic centers. Additional freight volumes toward Iran and Turkey will be generated through an international highway connecting China with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, establishing the groundwork for a comprehensive multimodal corridor spanning "China-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey/EU." The pilot phase of this initiative is anticipated to launch this year.
In parallel, two railway corridors are taking shape: the "China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey/EU" and "China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey/EU" routes.
Development of both corridors is advancing through regular consultations between railway officials from the six member states. Throughout 2025, the parties held two working sessions. The first convening occurred in May in Tehran, whereupon China inaugurated its inaugural freight service from Xi'an to Iran's leading dry port in Aprin, transiting through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The new rail link delivers cargo in just 15 days—cutting maritime shipping times in half.
By year-end 2025, container trains operating the "China-Iran" corridor had jumped to 40 annual departures—a dramatic increase from just 7 trains logged over the previous seven years.
Yet the ramifications of these intensified shipment flows extend well beyond Sino-Iranian trade, fundamentally enhancing transport connectivity between East Asia and Europe.
On August 2, 2025, railway executives from Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey gathered in Beijing for another round of negotiations on implementing the southern branch of the "East-West" corridor. The participants fleshed out the preliminary agreement reached at the May talks, cementing unified freight rates for the "China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey/EU" railway route, and rolling out measures to expand cargo throughput—including standardized delivery windows and expedited clearance procedures.
Iranian transit holds significant appeal for Central Asian states both as a terrestrial gateway to Turkey and Europe and as a crucial maritime outlet to the Indian Ocean through Iran's premier southern ports—Chabahar and Bandar Abbas.
In 2023, Uzbekistan unveiled plans to construct a cargo terminal and warehouse facilities at Chabahar's Shahid Beheshti port. In 2025, Kazakhstan announced development of a transport-logistics hub at the Shahid Rajai seaport, which forms part of the broader Bandar Abbas port infrastructure.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan place equal emphasis on transport cooperation with Tehran. Both countries are carving out access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through transit arrangements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These shifts emblematize the rapid advancement of multimodal "North-South" transport corridors and Central Asia's rising prominence in global logistics networks.
In 2024, cargo shipments along the eastern branch of the North-South International Transport Corridor surged nearly threefold from 2023 levels, reaching 2 million tons. This corridor channels freight to Iran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan via direct railway connections between the transit countries.
While the surge is predominantly fueled by Russian trade pivoting to South Asian markets amid international sanctions imposed following the Ukraine invasion, Central Asian states' intensifying commercial ties with India, Iran, and certain Persian Gulf monarchies are equally contributing to this momentum. The reorientation of Russian exports and the region's own growing trade engagements are reinforcing the corridor's strategic importance.

Thus, as Central Asia's logistical landscape undergoes a profound transformation, engagement with Iran—uniquely positioned with direct ocean access and a diverse transport infrastructure spanning roads to world-class seaports—emerges as critical to the region's ambitions. Despite facing international sanctions constraints, Central Asia's five republics demonstrate remarkable flexibility and pragmatism in their southern partnership, harnessing transport diplomacy as a potent instrument for unlocking their transit capabilities. The challenge ahead demands collective effort to dismantle the "choke points" plaguing the Southern transit corridor: harmonizing transport economics and legal frameworks across borders, aligning technical and technological standards, adopting unified shipping documentation, and establishing a coordinating authority to synchronize railway operations among participating nations.
Author: Nargiza Umarova, Director of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (UMED); Analyst, Bilim karvoni Research Institute, Uzbekistan

Source: Cronos.Asia