Marat Zembatov, Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at the Institute of State and Municipal Administration of the Higher School of Economics, member of the Russian-Omani Business Council at the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, expert of the BRICS Business Council Transport and Infrastructure Group, Ph.D. in Economics:
"Iran and Russia are rapidly moving away from the dollar in their mutual settlements, a shift that's impacting the transport sector. In the past two years, our countries have connected their banking systems and begun integrating payment card networks, enabling cross-border transactions to bypass restrictions imposed by SWIFT disconnection. Significant milestones have been achieved: Russia's SPFS and Iran's SEPAM financial messaging systems established direct communication in January 2023, and by May 2025, we completed the second phase of integration between Russia's 'Mir' card system and Iran's 'Shetab' network. As a result, Russian Mir cards are now accepted at payment terminals throughout Iran.
By the end of this year, we can realistically expect full bilateral roaming of payment cards. Despite significant growth potential remaining for SPFS, the system's reach is expanding—as of late 2024, the Central Bank reported 177 foreign participants from 24 countries (the latest official information available from the Central Bank).
Today, facing sanctions and compliance risks from unfriendly nations, companies engaged in international trade are adopting a hybrid approach, combining ruble and rial transactions with payments in third currencies such as the Chinese yuan or Emirati dirham. While expanding card solutions to other countries in the region is being actively discussed, stakeholders remain cautious, recalling what happened with Turkey, where Mir cards were initially promoted as a universal payment option nationwide before private institutions like Isbank and Denizbank suspended Mir transactions on September 19, 2022, followed by Turkish state banks severing their Mir partnerships just ten days later amid sanctions concerns. Although this setback hasn't halted the broader trend toward settlements in national currencies, it has noticeably slowed the financial expansion of Russian payment systems across friendly nations throughout the Global East.
What other developments are we seeing in local payment mechanisms between friendly nations?
In trade between India and Russia, for example, there's a dynamic interplay between dirham and yuan-based transactions. Throughout 2023, Indian refineries primarily paid for Russian oil imports in Emirati dirhams. This was followed by an extended period where the Chinese yuan became the predominant settlement currency. Through this pragmatic approach, the limitations of non-convertible local currencies are effectively addressed by mutually agreeing to use the currency of another friendly nation as an intermediary.
The actual integration of Russia and Iran's interbank payment systems within SPFS is vital for handling settlements related to transit and export rail operations along the International North-South Transport Corridor. And while cash transactions still dominate in Afghanistan, the expansion of railway connections and the anticipated launch of the Trans-Afghan Railway will likely spark new settlement mechanisms incorporating SPFS to protect the interests of both shippers and consignees...
The appeal of new payment systems that don't involve currencies and financial messaging systems of unfriendly countries is evident for transport and logistics operators across the Global South and East—it lies in reducing compliance and sanctions risks while offering relatively simple and accessible payment guarantee mechanisms.
Amid ongoing deliberations regarding a potential 'BRICS currency' this year, China announced the launch of a national digital alternative to SWIFT—the Renminbi Digital cross-border payment system. A payment system is more complex than just a channel for transmitting financial information; it's based on the state issuance of digital yuan, which isn't a cryptocurrency but serves as a full-fledged state payment instrument. According to official PRC data for 2025, financial operations equivalent to $90 billion have been conducted through Renminbi Digital. The consensus expert forecast is that by 2028, up to 25% of China's international settlements will go through Renminbi Digital.
The competition among national operators of digital cross-border systems will intensify. Similar to the rivalry between international transport corridors, this competition is driven by the fundamental motivation behind all economic activity: how to generate reliable and swift revenue while minimizing unnecessary risks. And where financial incentives exist, technological advancement becomes inevitable. We will continue to monitor the situation”.
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