Outline of the Greater Eurasian Partnership
The Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) is a practical embodiment of the integration idea of creating Greater Eurasia as a space for equal partnership, a polycentric world order, and equitable, multi-speed and mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin was the one who launched the initiative to create the GEP, putting it forward in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2015.
According to paragraph 54 of the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept of Russia, the following are the supporting pillars in the formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership:
¾ The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU);
¾ The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO);
¾ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and also
¾ The alignment of the EAEU with China's Belt and Road Initiative, while maintaining the possibility of participation in this partnership of all interested states and multilateral associations in the Eurasian continent.
Outline of the countries of the Greater Eurasian Partnership
Source: compiled by the authors
In the academic community, the GEP concept has been developed within the framework of situational analyses conducted by the Valdai International Discussion Club. In addition to the theoretical justification for Russia's “pivot to the East,” experts have focused on the strategic importance of Siberia and the Far East as key areas of potential economic growth. In one of the Club's reports, the GEP is interpreted as follows: “The Greater Eurasian Partnership or Community is, firstly, a conceptual framework of geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geoideological thinking aimed at the decades ahead, setting the vector of interaction between the continent's states. It should be aimed at the joint economic, political, and cultural revival and development of dozens of Eurasian countries that were previously backward or suppressed, and the transformation of Eurasia into the center of the world economy and politics.”
The GEP is viewed as a tool for overcoming the ideological and institutional fault lines left over from the Cold War. Among the promising areas of activity within the GEP, the report names the formation of a GEP transport strategy; the creation of independent rating agencies; the development of an alternative to the SWIFT payment system; the expansion of the practice of settlements in national currencies; the formation of independent payment mechanisms; establishment of an economic information center, “parallel to the OECD” and acting in coordination with it; the creation of a Eurasian system of mutual assistance in the event of emergencies, climatic and man-made disasters; the formation of a comprehensive “information and analytical mega-agency”; as well as the “reconstruction and creation of a single historical and cultural identity of Eurasia and the world, complementing the predominantly European-oriented narrative of world history, which still dominates in the world.”
The development of the GEP implies both strengthening existing institutions and forming new ones that differ in nature from their Western counterparts. We are talking about gradual institutionalization based on specific practices and values inherent in the Eurasian space. In this process, an important role is played by the adaptation of negotiation mechanisms, the development of models for coordinating interests and decision-making based on the historical and cultural traditions of Eurasia.
At the global level, the Greater Eurasian Partnership is positioned as an alternative development center capable of challenging the dominant influence of the West and its value system. The main objective of the GEP is not only to identify new points of economic growth, but also to build a development model based on principles which differ from those of the West — cooperation instead of competition, and the harmonization of interests rather than the desire for dominance.
In response to the current challenges of recent years, on December 25, 2023, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council approved the Declarations on the continuation of economic integration within the EAEU for the period up to 2030 and 2045, outlining a strategic course called the “Eurasian Economic Path.” The document defines six priority areas: providing the EAEU common market with basic goods and resources and increasing its efficiency; creating a single space for technological cooperation and collaboration; forming an integrated transport and logistics infrastructure; developing a common financial market; deepening interaction in promising industries with high integration potential; and positioning the EAEU as an influential economic center in the international arena.
In addition to the EAEU, the core of the GEP includes the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the first institutional embodiment of the Eurasian region since the end of the Cold War. As of 2025, the territory of the SCO member states covers 65% of the total area of the Eurasian continent (35 million km2), and the combined population is 3.5 billion people (40% of the world's population). The SCO brings together the largest states of Eurasia.
Russia is the largest state in the world by territory, one of the two largest nuclear powers, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It controls the shortest (northern) sea route from Europe to Asia, and is also a territorial link between the various regions of Greater Eurasia. China is the world’s second largest economy by nominal GDP and the largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP); according to some sources, it has the world’s largest population. India is the world’s third-largest economy by PPP and, according to recent data, now has the world’s largest population. Among the SCO states, Russia, China, India and Iran have all launched satellites into space; Russia, China, India and Pakistan all possess nuclear weapons.
Among the specific priorities of Russian foreign policy in promoting the GEP concept is deepening cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was formed in 1967 at the initiative of five countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Later, in 1976, Brunei joined the association, and in the 1990s, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar joined.
Russia received the status of an ASEAN dialogue partner during the meeting of foreign ministers of the Association, which was held on July 20-21, 1996 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The key document regulating the principles of interaction between ASEAN countries is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (also known as the Bali Treaty), which Russia joined in 2004. This agreement opened up new opportunities for developing cooperation and deepening dialogue between Russia and ASEAN. Since 2005, the format of the Russia-ASEAN dialogue has been officially in effect, receiving the status of “developed and comprehensive.”
The Russia-ASEAN dialogue is characterized by a high degree of institutionalization and sustainable dynamics. Within the framework of the GEP, it has acquired a long-term dimension, focusing not only on current interaction, but also on building a sustainable architecture of security and cooperation in Eurasia. Regular Russia-ASEAN summits, participation in the East Asia Summit and active interaction within the framework of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) have contributed to the consolidation of political positions and strengthening strategic trust.
In 2013, in Astana, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the Chinese initiative of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), later transformed into the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative. The OBOR was supposed to connect the world's largest production site (China) with key sales markets across Eurasia. In order to create corresponding infrastructure and ensure that it continues to function well, it was proposed not just to conclude numerous bilateral agreements with the relevant states, but to create a full-fledged system that would include financial, scientific, technical and political support from China.
As a result, the EAEU and OBOR emerged as the flagship Eurasian projects by the mid-2010s. Both were focused on attracting the Central Asian states. However, due to the difference in approaches and structures of these projects and due to high-quality interaction between Russia and China, it was possible to achieve their successful convergence, officially termed “conjugation.” In May 2015, a Joint Statement on Cooperation in Conjugating the Construction of the EAEU and the SREB was signed, followed by a clarification of their goals. Later, the need was noted to unite the EAEU, SCO and ASEAN on the basis of openness, transparency and the consideration of the interests of the parties in order to create an effective dialogue mechanism and build the Eurasian Economic Partnership.
The conjugation consists of institutional support for the Chinese initiative from the EAEU. In turn, the OBOR, due to the flexibility of cooperation, can attract a large pool of states, which indirectly has a positive effect on the functioning of the EAEU.
It is worth noting the main difference between the two conjugating structures. While the EAEU is an example of integration based on intergovernmental cooperation, the OBOR is an inclusive initiative and framework without a specific structure under the leadership of China.
Despite its initial economic focus, the GEP project inevitably touches on security issues. In scientific circles, the need to form a “special type of non-Western regionalism” is increasingly being discussed, within which Russia and China are considered key actors. At the same time, despite the common understanding of the importance of integration processes, the approaches of the two countries to issues of economic interaction and security may differ significantly. Thus, the Greater Eurasian Partnership initiative acts as an important vector for the transformation of the international system towards a more just and sustainable world order, in which Eurasia is viewed not as the periphery of global processes, but as one of its independent and equal centers.
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